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Abstract
Shareholders in the airline industry invest in a service industry that is met with high fixed costs,
capital, and external factors such as customer satisfaction and fluctuations in crude oil prices.
On one end of the airline spectrum in the United States lie the full-service airlines, such as Delta
Air Lines, American Airlines, or United Airlines adopting a product differentiation approach to
capture a competitive advantage by providing greater benefits, comfort, and experience to the
customer. This approach attracts customers that value the experience more so than simply the
price of the fare, but is often met with high operating costs such as training, and maintenance
inventory in addition to the complexity of having a diverse fleet of aircraft. On the other end of
the spectrum lie the low-cost and ultra-low cost carriers which include Spirit Airlines, Southwest
Airlines, and JetBlue Airways. The latter of the three airlines, Spirit Airlines, operates as an
ultra-low cost approach where any extras are charged to the customer in the form of ancillary
fees at the extreme end of the cost leadership approach. While Southwest Airlines and JetBlue
Airways are still considered low-cost carriers, the former is known for its free checked baggage,
the latter operates a hybrid low cost-product differentiation approach with its premium seating on
its transcontinental flights in efforts to gain a competitive advantage. Achieving a competitive
advantage and increasing market share is among other performance indicators for enticing
shareholders to invest in an airline. This will be discussed in more detail in this thesis and
whether a full-service airline or low-cost carrier is better positioned to attract shareholders.

COMPARISON OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE FSA VS LCC

8

Definition of Key Terms
Cost leadership. This is a business-level strategy employed by airline administrators operating
at a lower cost, which often results in a reduction in customer-perceived benefit, but would target
and appeal to the price-sensitive traveler (Holloway, 2008).

Competitive advantage. Within the airline industry, competitive advantage occurs when airline
administrators are able to provide a greater level of benefit to customers for the same cost as
their rivals or provide the same level of benefit to customers at a lower cost than their rivals,
essentially gaining an advantage through a cost leadership or product differentiation strategy
(Holloway, 2008).

Customer loyalty. Emotional or functional loyalty to an airline, which determines the chance of
a traveler flying with the same airline as it relates to the airline industry through the use of
customer retention programs to segment and target frequent flyers with the use of consumer
loyalty programs low (Holloway, 2008).

Customer relationship. Through the use of product customization, consumer marketing and
reputation, an airline can customize their services and target different consumer groups through
advertising, developing a relationship with the customer while also developing a reputation from
how the customer perceives the service’s elements and quality (Barney & Hesterly, 2012).

COMPARISON OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE FSA VS LCC
Customer satisfaction. Customer satisfaction in terms of the performance of a company, is the
individual’s appraisal or perception of the company, whether favorable or unfavorable, and
whether the performance matches up with the customer’s expectation of service quality against
any disutility experienced by the customer (Holloway, 2008; Leong, Hew, Lee, & Ooi, 2015).
Customer satisfaction is a necessary factor that helps to create customer loyalty, which covers
the customer’s willingness to provide a positive referral to others and assists in stable revenue
generation (Leong et al., 2015).

Dividend. A dividend is where shareholders receive a portion of the earnings of a company in
the form of shares of a stock, cash, or some other form of property. In the case where the net
earnings, or net profit is kept within the company, it is known as Retained Earnings. Dividends
occur more often in well-established companies rather than new start-ups because the latter
reinvests their profits to help grow the company.

Earnings per share. A major variable in determining the performance of a company, earnings
per share is the amount of net income after liabilities to other investors are paid, which is then
distributed among the weighted average of outstanding shares to the ordinary shareholders
(Maynard, 2013).

External environment. A broad term encompassing the interrelated elements of technological,
economic, demographic, cultural, legal and political, and specific international events that
manifest into opportunities or threats within an airline’s competitive environment (Barney &
Hesterly, 2012).

9
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Full-service airline. A full-service airline generally utilizes the product differentiation businesslevel strategy, provides passengers with a more comfortable traveling experience, and is
attributed with a wider global network than that of a low-cost carrier focused on catering to the
price-sensitive traveler (Holloway, 2008).

Internal environment. A term encompassing the internal tangible and intangible resources and
capabilities of an airline that manifest into its strengths and weaknesses through an analysis of
the airline’s value, rarity, imitability and organization, that may be manipulated by airline
administrators to achieve a competitive advantage (Barney & Hesterly, 2012).

Product differentiation. A business-level strategy that may be utilized by airline administrators
to achieve a competitive advantage through the improvement of the perception of the value
created by its service relative to its rivals in terms of factors which may include but are not
limited to its global network, reputation, or premium in-cabin amenities (Barney & Hesterly,
2012; Holloway, 2008).

Revenue model. A business model, which lends coherence to an airline’s strategy towards
earning revenues through the configuration of its internal and external resources such as the
design of its products and services (Holloway, 2008).
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Shareholder. A shareholder is the formal owner of a company that would have interest in the
positive financial performance of that firm. With corporations, shareholders are not responsible
for a company’s debt obligations except for the amount that person invested in the company.
These shareholders receive a portion of any dividends the company executives decide to declare
and a share of the proceeds in case the company in question liquidates.

Shareholder equity. Not to be confused with shareholder value, shareholder equity is an
accounting term that represents the total amount of a company’s liabilities subtracted from the
company’s total assets. (Investopedia, n.d.). The result from the shareholder equity is used to
calculate the value of a company, incorporating the components of outstanding shares, additional
paid-in capital, retained earnings, and treasury stock (Investopedia, n.d.).

Shareholder value. Shareholder value is a value that is delivered to a shareholder from a
company through the use of dividends or increase in share price. Administrators looking to
create such value should focus on creating long-term value rather than the short-term goals
(Mauboussin, 2011). Airline executives must create the right balance in pricing, and customer
and employee satisfaction, while creating value for the company to create sustainable value.

Strategy. Actions that together form and support a set of goals in support of achieving a
competitive advantage as its ultimate goal, which must be integrated with its strategic
management process after the mission has been defined by the airline (Barney & Hesterly, 2012;
Holloway, 2008).
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Subsidiaries. A term that is also known as airlines-within-airlines (AWA) that some network
airlines have tried to create to target a separate segment of the traveling consumer market, which
are created in large part in response to the threat of the low-cost carrier (Pearson & Merkert,
2014).
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Introduction
Airline administrators in today’s intensely competitive environment must compete and
manage the internal and external environment to satisfy both the customer and the shareholders.
These shareholders are, by definition, owners of a company that are not typically involved in a
company’s day-to-day operation, but benefit from from a company’s increase in market value
through stock market trading. On one side of the airline spectrum, low-cost carriers such as Spirit
Airlines have concentrated on a cost-leadership approach, providing low fares to customers
while charging fees for any additional services as ancillary revenues. On the other side of the
airline spectrum, airline administrators for full-service airlines have primarily adopted the
product differentiation approach in establishing premium airport and in-flight services and
amenities to attract the customers who value a more comfortable travel experience more so than
the price-sensitive traveler.
Strategies have been put in place by airline administrators amidst an external
environment that can significantly impact the airline industry through customer preferences,
economic stability, or specific severe international events such as the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. All this is compounded onto the
increasingly competitive environment that exists within the airline industry, where administrators
for low-cost carriers are targeting the price-sensitive travelers through a cost leadership
approach. On the other side of the spectrum, administrators for full-service airlines are counting
on product differentiation to achieve a competitive advantage over their rivals. There have even
been some attempts to close the gap between the low-cost carrier and the full-service airline
through the use of airline subsidiaries, which have had little to no success, except in the case of
JetStar Airways in Australia. This paper will also highlight the implications of negative
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publicity events on a customer’s emotion and ultimately, the customer’s loyalty in an
information age. With the help of social media, negative publicity can very quickly and severely
impact the general public’s perception of an airline.
The internal and external environments within the airline industry are critical factors for
airline administrators to consider when managing the resources of any airline, especially in a
fiercely competitive industry. Internal tools available to an airline administrator include the
physical, financial, individual, and organizational resources of an airline. These tools can be
configured in a way to advantage of opportunities or mitigate threats in the external environment
such as changes in fuel costs, changes in the political environment, social atmosphere,
technological breakthroughs, or environmental issues. Factors of particular importance in the
airline service industry are the safety and security of the aircraft as well as customer satisfaction.
This paper will analyze some of the specific factors in the internal and external environment that
airline administrators need to be aware of, especially in today’s information age where buyer
power and the voice of customers can translate into severely impacting the financial performance
of an airline through reviews and the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI). This paper
will also highlight the cost and revenue models as it relates, respectively, to the internal and
external environments.
Product differentiation is a business-level strategy that is based out of the revenue model,
which focuses on maximizing revenues. This strategy is utilized by administrators for fullservice airlines such as Delta Air Lines, Emirate Airlines, and Lufthansa Airlines to name a few.
In addition to competing with other full-service airlines, airline administrators for these airlines
must now also compete with low-cost carriers in order to stay competitive, especially during
times of economic uncertainty, by implementing cost efficiency measures in conjunction with
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creating a distinct and differentiated product. While some airline administrators choose to
differentiate its airline through premium amenities and services, a core factor in differentiating
an airline from its rivals would be its policy and performance on its customer relationships and
satisfaction. In the modern information age of the early 21st century, the average passenger is
greatly empowered through the use of the Internet and social media platforms such as Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube. Through this empowerment, customer satisfaction is closely correlated to
an airline’s reputation, and ultimately, related also to the airline’s competitive advantage.
Cost leadership is a business-level strategy that is based out of the cost model, which
focuses on reducing costs in order to charge a lower fare catered towards the more price sensitive
travelers. This strategy is widely believed to have begun in the United States, with the successful
strategic operation of Southwest Airlines. It is typically implemented by administrators of lowcost carriers, but recent developments have shown that such a strategy is not exclusive to that
category of air transport carrier. Full-service airlines have begun to implement low price options
for their customers, which have rigid restrictions on what the passenger can or cannot do in terms
of changing flights, times, seats, or cancelling their itinerary altogether. As airlines become
increasingly scrutinized by the mainstream media along with increasing scrutiny from existing
and potential customers, airlines need to be increasingly vigilant in providing a safe and sanitary
environment in which travelers can reach their destination in a timely and relatively inexpensive
manner.
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Literature Review
Strategies and Business Models
Airline administrators today operate in an industry where they must adapt to a constantly
changing external environment by developing and implementing strategies appropriate to any
given scenario. In order to do this, these airline administrators need to understand the dynamics
of the airline industry and its competitive nature in order to achieve a competitive advantage.
They also need to understand the demographics of the customers who travel, because there are
price-sensitive travelers who will only travel with the airline with the lowest possible price, such
as Spirit Airlines, while other customers are willing to pay a premium price for amenities and
services such as airport lounges or premium cabins for a more comfortable flying experience.
With increases in competition, airline administrators had been forced to develop strategies, new
business models (being the cost and revenue models), develop new innovations to become more
efficient, or face mergers or the possibility of declaring bankruptcy (Fu, Oum, & Zhang, 2010).
Strategy is an important subject for airline administrators to consider because an effective
or ineffective business strategy can mean the difference between a successful airline and a
failure. Barney and Hesterly (2012) described strategy as “a firm’s…theory of how to gain
competitive advantages” (p. 24). Without a competitive advantage, any firm existing within the
modern competitive environment of the early 21st century, would not have been seen by
consumers as having any more of an “economic value than [its] rival firms” (Barney & Hesterly,
2012, p. 10). Choosing an effective strategy for the firm through the strategic management
process, “requires that a firm engage in an analysis of threats and opportunities” (Barney &
Hesterly, 2012, p. 59) which involve 6 areas within the general environment: “technological
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change, demographic trends, cultural trends, economic climate, legal and political conditions,
and specific international events” (Barney & Hesterly, 2012, p. 59).
Some of these threats introduced by authors Franke and John (2011) include the
economic downturn of the 2001 crisis as a result of the “bursting of the dot.com bubble” (p. 19)
and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (9/11). These would be considered as a threat from
the economic climate as well as severe and specific international events from the general
environment. In relation to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in particular, the aftermath of the attacks
resulted in a significant drop in demand levels for air travel world-wide (Franke & John, 2011).
Air transport demand did not return to its former levels until 2004, which was in part due to a
double-dip effect as a result of the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) pandemic threat in
2003. This presented an opportunity for the administrators for the low-cost carriers.
Administrators for low-cost carriers used a cost leadership approach which earned them a
competitive advantage for the increasing number of price-sensitive travelers. In addition, the
simplicity of the low-cost carrier revenue model with “few restrictions on ticket usage”
(Holloway, 2008, p. 32), schedule reliability and a simple point-to-point price structure were
appealing to passengers. The cost model for these low-cost carriers allowed them to pass along
operational cost savings in the form of low prices for tickets; cost model decisions were aligned
to the business strategy by having one type of aircraft in the fleet and not using premium airport
services (Holloway, 2008, p. 34). With the onset of the 2008 global recession, global air traffic
had decreased by 6.1% for 2009 according to the International Air Transport Association (IATA)
(as cited in Franke & John, 2011, p. 20). Airline administrators had to review their internal
strategies to become more efficient and stay competitive in a saturated low-cost carrier market.
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One of the strategies used was the concept of airline subsidiaries. “The continued growth
in the [low-cost carrier] airlines from their traditional domestic markets represents an increasing
and significant threat to the long-term viability of the legacy airlines” (Taneja, 2010). The
administrators for these legacy airlines, or full service airlines (FSAs), who traditionally use
product differentiation through a revenue model approach, wished to counter this threat by
launching subsidiaries, or “colloquially known as airlines-within-airlines (AWA)” (Pearson &
Merkert, 2014, p. 21). Pearson and Merkert (2014) continued to explain that for the airline
subsidiaries, with 31 currently operating airlines-within-airlines, 18 of those operate within the
Asia-Pacific region. In addition to this, another four proposed subsidiaries indicate “that this
region is at the forefront of AWA development” (Pearson & Merkert, 2014, p. 25).
Administrators for these legacy airlines had difficulty with balancing out the operational costs of
their subsidiaries and also did not have the first-mover advantage that benefited experienced lowcost carriers such as Southwest Airlines, Air Asia, or Ryanair (Pearson & Merkert, 2014, pp. 25–
26). In addition to this, the poor planning and poor strategy development caused the AWA
strategy, which in the case of the United States (U.S.) and Europe, “virtually all [low-cost
subsidiary] (LCS) airlines in these markets failed” (Homsombat, Lei, & Fu, 2014, p. 3). The
reason for the continued growth of AWAs in Asian countries continue to be somewhat
ambiguous to researchers (Homsombat et al., 2014) because while this practice had not been
successful in the United States and Europe, international and domestic markets in Asia have
experienced at least one particular success story. Similar to how other FSAs have created a
subsidiary as a reactionary measure to low-cost carriers but failed, administrators for JetStar
Airways, which is owned entirely by Qantas Group, have done the same and have “achieved
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very promising results in terms of traffic growth and financial returns” (Homsombat et al., 2014,
p. 12).
While these strategies of using airline subsidiaries are more of a cost leadership approach
to counter the increasing market share of low-cost carriers, there are still less price-sensitive
travelers who are willing to pay for a little more comfort. However, problems began to occur
when administrators for airlines try to do too much. Within North America and Europe in
particular, “network carriers…have made significant and often painful efforts to narrow the gap
between their unit costs and those of low-fare carriers…[but] there are structural reasons why the
gap can never be eliminated” (Holloway, 2008, p. 32).
Oliver (as cited in Forgas, Moliner, Sánchez, & Palau, 2010, p. 229) described loyalty as
“the transition from a favorable predisposition (affective loyalty) to a repeated purchase
commitment (conative loyalty) as a prior step to the action of purchase…[and that] true loyalty
begins…when emotional ties between customer and company are established” (p. 229). In
addition to the emotional connection, there also must be trust and perceived value in the eyes of
the customer (Forgas et al., 2010, p. 230). McCartney (2014) explained that “airlines have
crammed in more seats …filling higher percentages of their seats on planes, meaning more
battles for overhead bin space and elbow room” (para. 4). Certain FSAs such as United Airlines
or Delta Air Lines offer premium economy seats, available for no charge to “top-tier frequent
fliers” (McCartney, 2014b, para. 3) and a specified fee for other travelers. This would mean that
passengers are still either willing to pay for extra comfort or have traveled enough with an airline
to have an established expectation of the quality of service.
There have been a number of incidents regarding the reclining of these seats where one
passenger had reclined into another, which had led to a dispute while the aircraft was in flight.
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“Southwest Airlines at one point reduced how far its seats would track back” (McCartney,
2014b, para. 5) recognizing the fact that tighter seat configurations meant “crashing into the
space of the person behind you, [making it] impossible to work on a laptop in a standard coach
seat if the person in front of you reclines” (McCartney, 2014b, para. 4). Knowledge of this in
advance of the planning of the seating configuration would have a positive impact on customer
loyalty as opposed to Delta Air Lines’ approach by increasing the recline, but having negative
publicity due to one passenger reclining into another (McCartney, 2014b, para. 5). This negative
publicity, especially if it is broadcast around the country, would have a negative impact on the
emotional ties to any loyalty a customer may have towards an airline. Today’s information age
no longer conforms, as stated by Deighton “[to the] old world of Super Bowl ads and [reaching]
prime-time audiences” (Hanna, 2010, para. 4). These prime-time advertisements would cost
millions of dollars, whereas today, someone only needs to be connected to the Internet to access
a wide range of information. In stark contrast to the prime-time advertisements, the song posted
by Canadian musician Dave Carroll, the producer for the viral music video United Breaks
Guitars (see URL: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YGc4zOqozo), was only “produced for
$150… [caught the] attention of a multi-billion dollar corporation… [and had reached the]
mainstream media” (Hanna, 2010, para. 2–3) and an audience of 4.6 million within the span of a
month. As Forgas et al. (2010) explained how there must be trust and perceived value from the
customer’s point of view; such mistreatment of baggage would have a negative impact on a
customer’s emotional opinion of the airline, namely United Airlines in particular, which would
affect customer loyalty.
While there are some external events that cannot be foreseen, airline administrators must
remain vigilant in understanding their rivals and the competitive environment of the airline
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industry. Additional research needs to be done to understand why airline subsidiaries has seen
success with JetStar, but have seen failure in the U.S. and European markets. It is also important
for airline administrators to be responsive to the external environment and to customer issues,
especially in today’s modern world where information is readily available to anyone with an
Internet connection. Failure to be responsive in these scenarios could mean a loss of consumer
confidence, through their emotions about an airline. This would lead to a loss of customer
loyalty and eventually, the revenues of the airlines. Ultimately, however, airline administrators
must be vigilant in maintaining their competitive advantage, through the use of either their cost
or revenue models to differentiate themselves from their rivals.

The Internal and External Environment
Airline administrators need to be aware of the internal and external environment that
affect the industry in which they operate in order to effectively manage an airline. External
environmental factors can be categorized into the five categories in the PESTE model, being
political, economic, social, technological, and environmental factors; any of these factors can
change at any time, and without warning. Also within the external environment is the American
Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), which “measures the satisfaction of U.S. household
consumers with the quality of products and services offered by…firms with significant share in
U.S. markets…[by surveying] roughly 70,000 customers…[per year] about the products and
services they use the most” (ACSI, 2014, para. 1). Internal factors include the organizational,
individual, physical, and financial resources of a company as well as its strengths and
weaknesses that can be configured to help neutralize or mitigate the threats or take advantage of
opportunities from the external environment (Barney & Hesterly, 2012).
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The four internal resources according to Barney and Hesterly (2012) include physical,
financial, individual, and organizational resources, which are interrelated and help form a
“coherent contribution to...[an airline’s] strategic theme” (Holloway, 2008, p. 23). A physical
resource analysis would represent physical equipment and technology used for an airline; noted
when Executive Vice President Nico Buchholz, fleet management for Lufthansa Airlines, wanted
“’an aircraft...larger than...the current families’ of narrowbodies” (as cited in Wall, 2014, para.
2). Continuing this theme, Michael Powell, Chief Financial Officer for Europe’s Wizz Air
Holdings, stated that “a new design would...provide an opportunity for a new manufacturer to
challenge the duopoly for jetliner production above 150 seats where Airbus and Boeing rule” (as
cited in Wall, 2014, para. 11). These are examples how an internal analysis made by these
airline administrators determined that they had a need for an aircraft manufacturer to design a
new type of aircraft. It is also important to assess the individual resources or human resources,
which “include the training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships, and insight of
individual managers and workers in a firm...[such as with] Southwest Airlines, [where] each
employee...is seen as essential for [its] overall success” (Barney & Hesterly, 2012, pp. 66–67).
To highlight the financial aspect of an internal analysis, airline administrators for lowcost carriers (LCCs) have used the cost model to conduct a cost leadership approach. According
to Brüggen and Klose (2010), “fleet commonality is pivotal for the low-cost airline model
because a carrier can enjoy...significant cost advantages over competitors with diversified fleets”
(p. 300). Additionally, in exercising this fleet commonality, crews can be interchanged more
easily than airlines with a diversified fleet, less training is required, and maintenance and
servicing tools and parts can be standardized, which is directly in line with reducing costs. In
exercising the cost leadership approach, this increased cost efficiency in operations would
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ultimately create a competitive advantage, which would appeal to the price-sensitive travelers
(Brüggen & Klose, 2010; Low & Lee, 2014). In addition, researchers Low and Lee (2014)
promoted the option for airline administrators to pursue the acquisition of more aircraft to
“expand their network to serve routes of longer distances…[which can] differentiate [full-service
airlines] against low cost carriers, …which mostly provide point-to-point short distance
connections” (p. 30).
Another way of analyzing the internal capabilities of an airline would be a “resourcebased view (RBV), [which can be used to] model [a firm’s] performance [while focusing] on the
resources and capabilities controlled by a firm as sources of competitive advantage” (Barney &
Hesterly, 2012, p. 66). Researchers Low and Lee (2014) made use of this “RBV model to
undertake a longitudinal analysis on the competitiveness of 114 major international passenger
airlines using observational data” (p. 23). They discovered that as a result of advances in
technology, airline administrators can place a greater focus on Internet sales and ticketing to
reduce labor costs and increase market share and profitability (Low & Lee, 2014).
According to Barney and Hesterly (2012), “a firm’s mission...define both what a firm
aspires to be in the long run and what it wants to avoid in the meantime” (pp. 4-5). In addition to
the internal analyses, airline administrators need to examine their external environment because
“competitive strategy is driven [by not only] internal, firm-specific considerations, [but also] the
structure of external markets” (Holloway, 2008, p. 205). According to Barney and Hesterly
(2012), the general environment that a firm operates “[consist] of six interrelated elements:
technological change, demographic trends, cultural trends, the economic climate, legal and
political conditions, and specific international events” (p. 30). However, neither internal nor
external environments occur completely independent of each other. For example, customer
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satisfaction is a factor that can very rapidly affect the general public’s perception of the airline
through word of mouth as well as econometric performance benchmarking via the American
Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI).
The results from ACSI, which assesses key customer satisfaction drivers such as the
“ease of the check-in process...courtesy and helpfulness of flight crew...boarding experience
[and] quality of in-flight services” (ACSI, 2014b, para. 6) can direct airline administrators to
leverage their individual or organizational resources to take advantage of an external opportunity
or mitigate an external threat. As airlines are service organizations, a positive “customer
experience can be the most valuable asset...[where] contact employees...play a critical role in
shaping [those experiences]” (Babbar & Koufteros, 2008). Donnelly (as cited in Babber &
Koufteros, 2008) stated, “the mission of Southwest Airlines is dedicated to the highest quality of
Customer Service delivered with a sense of warmth, friendliness, individual price, and Company
Spirit” (p. 825). While airlines in the United States “seem to fall short of the standard...[of
service quality], Southwest Airlines has shown [that] it is indeed possible to be successful and
consistently profitable in an intensely competitive industry” (Babbar & Koufteros, 2008, p. 825).
An external factor affecting airlines is the price of crude oil, which had “yielded
significant elasticity estimates...[indicating] rising oil prices [had] a detrimental effect on tourism
demand [through the rise of the air fares]” (Seetaram, 2010, p. 32). Airline administrators can
respond proactively to the threat of higher crude oil prices by analyzing the fuel and weight
efficiency of its aircraft by choosing more fuel-efficient aircraft. Another method for airline
administrators to consider could be the reduction of the weight of on-board cabin items, training
programs to help pilots taxi or fly in a more fuel-efficient manner, or reductions in non-essential
fuel loads but still satisfy the Federal Aviation Administration alternate airport requirements.
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There has been evidence of companies that have benefited from a first-mover advantage
in other industries, but there is a significant risk for firms’ administrators who make the first
move in adopting a new kind of technology. Tellis (2014) stated that first-mover advantages are
not as advantageous as some scholars claim it to be. Market leaders today such as Microsoft in
operating systems, Apple in relation to music on-the-go, Amazon in online book stores, and
Google in terms of Internet searches were not pioneers in their respective specialties, yet they are
vastly more successful than the first-movers in each of the aforementioned business sectors
(Tellis, 2014). In relation to the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, a statement made by Calin Rovinescu,
the Chief Executive Officer for Air Canada in 2013, stated the “attention...the 787 received...as a
result of a number of technical problems...[reconfirmed] the wisdom of avoiding the ‘first
mover’ step and [wait] to take delivery of a new aircraft model only after the initial problems are
fixed” (as cited in Deveau, 2013, para. 3). This was in the aftermath of the grounding of the
Boeing 787 fleet as a result of “two incidents involving the aircraft’s lithium-ion batteries
catching fire” (Deveau, 2013, para. 9), which would have a negative effect on an airline’s
revenues in addition to causing an inconvenience to the passengers scheduled to be on that
aircraft. This would cause a decrease in customer satisfaction, especially for time-sensitive
travelers who need to get to their destinations on time.
Airline administrators have used a revenue model to pursue a product differentiation
strategy through the introduction of premium economy seats, which can be seen as a response to
a poor ACSI rating for seat comfort in conjunction with the mediocre score for in-flight services;
both are considered as “the most important in terms of customer satisfaction” (ACSI, 2014c, p.
3). To connect with the millennial generation, airlines need to pursue “the full potential of
mobile devices in terms of engaging with passengers, improving the customer experience,
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cutting costs, and increasing revenue” (Taneja, 2010). Social networking sites such as
Facebook, Twitter, or YouTube are commonly used platforms for customer complaints, such as
the example with the music video United Breaks Guitars by musician Dave Carroll, which was
widely reported in the media, and was triggered by the breaking of the musician’s guitar by
United Airlines’ baggage handlers (Taneja, 2010). To mitigate such threats, airline
administrators need to deploy human resources to address customer complaints on social media,
which can have a positive effect on demonstrating that they care about their customers (Taneja,
2010).
It is important for airline administrators to understand how the internal and external
environments relate to one another, and how they can leverage their resources to mitigate
external threats or take advantage of external opportunities. Airlines need to maintain its pace
with today’s modern tech-savvy generation in using mobile devices and social media.
Benchmarks such as the ACSI can be useful tools for airline administrators to see where
customer satisfaction levels are lacking to empower them to implement plans and solutions to
create a better customer experience and ultimately, a competitive advantage.

Product Differentiation
All airline administrators make use of a revenue model and a cost model, but it is the
implementation of either the cost leadership or the product differentiation business-level strategy
that determines the framework for how the airline is structured. Barney and Hesterly (2012)
defined product differentiation as “a business strategy [where] firms attempt to gain a
competitive advantage by increasing the perceived value of their products or services relative to
the perceived value of other firms’ products or services” (p. 132). Porter (as cited in Holloway,
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2008) stated that “one purpose of product differentiation is to reduce cross-price elasticity by
weakening the perception that competing products are real substitutes” (p. 85). Unlike
administrators for low-cost carriers, who achieve a competitive advantage through lower costs
and lower fares, administrators for full-service airlines, who use the product differentiation
approach, implement “innovative product design[s], the development of a strong brand image,
and the nurturing of a loyal customer base” (Holloway, 2008, p. 160) with the help of frequent
flyer programs in order to maximize their revenues. In addition to the frequent flyer loyalty
programs, according to Cento (2009), full-service airlines are typically characterized by a global
hub-and-spoke network, as well as membership within an airline alliance.
One of the major threats to the administrators of these full-service airlines is the low-cost
carrier. Button (as cited in Hazledine, 2011) stated that in “the analytical context of the ‘empty
core’ hypothesis,...large fixed costs incurred by [full-service airlines] make it difficult...for them
to set prices adequate to cover all their costs without those prices being well above marginal
variable costs” (p. 130). As a result, full-service airlines become “vulnerable to marginal cost
pricing by rivals...[such as] low cost carriers [that have lower] fixed costs of their own to cover
because of their flexible, route profitability-based business model” (Hazledine, 2011, p. 130).
While some administrators for full-service airlines such as Air New Zealand tried to cut costs
through reducing meals and business class seats, other airline administrators can focus on
product attributes and services, relationships between the customer contact employees and the
customer, or linkages between firms, such as a global airline alliance network (Barney &
Hesterly, 2012). Cento (2009) mentioned that full-service airlines have “used a combination of
stronger revenue growth and higher efficiency gains to offset the large impact of higher fuel
costs...[through the use of] fuel hedging...to protect against the shock of anticipated rises in [fuel]
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prices” (p. 27). Airline administrators are aware that more weight on board the aircraft increases
fuel burn, and therefore increases costs. Thinner and more lightweight seats have been installed
on board airlines such as Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, meaning that they are no longer
relegated to the realm of “ultra-cheap and charter operators” (McCartney, 2014c, para. 2). This,
however, comes at the cost of customer satisfaction, which according to a survey by TripAdvisor
(as cited in McCartney, 2014c) “83% said [the new, thinner seats] were less comfortable than
traditional seats” (para. 9).
Airline administrators have achieved a “greater cost efficiency...[through lowering]
their...distribution and overhead costs [with emphasis on]...non-fuel unit costs...since 2001”
(Cento, 2008, p. 43). Such “cost efficiency can also be achieved by mergers or acquisitions,
[which] has started mainly in Europe between the [full-service airlines]...but also between [lowcost carriers] (LCCs) (Cento, 2008, p. 41). An example of this was the “acquisition of KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines by Air France in 2004...[gaining a greater] European market share,
particularly among high-paying business [travelers] on long-haul flights” (Cento, 2008, p. 41).
However, such acquisitions and mergers may have a negative effect on customer satisfaction.
Following the “2010 merger with Continental [Airlines], United [Airlines was] still struggling
with passenger service...[which translated into] the lowest [American Customer Satisfaction
Index] (ACSI) score in the [airline] industry” (ACSI, 2014b, p. 1). ACSI Chairman and
Founder, Claes Fornell (as cited in American Customer Satisfaction Index [ACSI], 2014b) stated
“time and time again, the negative impact [that] mergers have [had] on customer satisfaction” (p.
1) noting the effects of Delta Air Lines’ merger with Northwest Airlines as well as the merger
with Southwest Airlines and AirTran Airways in addition to the United-Continental merger.
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Membership within global airline alliances such as Star Alliance, oneworld, and SkyTeam
can be very beneficial for airline administrators implementing a product differentiation businesslevel strategy because such membership can “influence consumer purchase intention by
enhancing the customer’s perception of brand equity and brand preference (Wang, 2014, p. 58).
Wang (2014) also stated that the “highly involved consumers, [which] represent the relatively
active passengers...[willing] to interact more with airlines and fly more frequently...care about
whether or not the target airline joined a global airline alliance, while the lowly involved
customers [did] not” (p. 58). Additionally, the behavior of the infrequent traveler would hold
less weight than frequent flyers because they “can only evaluate the benefits of global airline
alliances based on their expectations or from very limited experiences...[nor would they]
experience specific [top-tier] benefits of an airline” (Wang, 2014, p. 58).
One of the starkest examples of product differentiation in aviation history was the
Aérospatiale-British Aircraft Corporation (BAC) Concorde with its supersonic speeds that could
not be matched by any other commercial aircraft available to the general public, until its eventual
retirement in the early twenty-first century. In the value-rarity-imitability-organization (VRIO)
framework as described in Barney and Hesterly (2012), supersonic travel would have fallen into
the rarity category in the most extreme scenario while providing value to the extremely timesensitive travelers. Administrators for full-service airlines achieve a greater flexibility in pricing
when they sufficiently differentiate their products from their rivals to achieve a competitive
advantage (Barney & Hesterly, 2012). The issue with the Concorde was the premium pricing
necessary to cover the operating costs was prohibitive in the market place; the Concorde service
was so differentiated [the only in its kind] that it became a niche in which a few could afford. As
such, supersonic air travel underscores the customer-driven ceiling price is determined by the
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aggregate maximum reservation price passengers are willing to pay (F. Esquibel, personal
communication November 7, 2014).
It is not sufficient for airline administrators to depend solely on differentiators in onboard amenities or aircraft configurations. Rhoades and Waguespack (Babbar & Koufteros,
2008) stated that “passengers may use service quality [through interactions between customer
contact employees and customers] as a basis for judging the overall quality of an airline” (p. 805)
thus affecting the reputation of the airline. This reputation is possibly “the most
important...socially complex relationship between a firm and its customers...[that] can last a long
time, even if the basis for that reputation no longer exists” (Barney & Hesterly, 2012, p. 136).
Babbar and Koufteros (2008) also stated that “empirical evidence...shows that individual
attention, helpfulness, courtesy, and promptness embedded in the element of personal touch
shape the experience of airline customers and determine their level of satisfaction with the
airline” (p. 824).
An example of an airline using this strategy is Emirate Airlines, simply known as
Emirates, which is based out of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates in the Middle East (“The
remarkable record of Emirate Airlines: Product differentiation and cost control deliver
exceptional performance,” 2012). Emirates pursues this approach by drawing “attention to its
strategy as a high-quality provider, delivering a superior customer experience and focusing on
the details making up that experience...[in order to] highlight the quality of its customer service
and in-flight passenger comfort” (“The remarkable record of Emirate Airlines: Product
differentiation and cost control deliver exceptional performance,” 2012, p. 11). Other airlines
based within the United States have made efforts to improve on its customer relations through
being “more aggressive about intercepting [customer complaints] with emailed surveys and
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social media” (McCartney, 2014a, para. 5). Delta Air Lines’ Senior Vice President of airport
customer service, Bill Lentsch, (as cited in McCartney, 2014a) stated that “Delta worked...[on]
minimizing taxi times, as well as speeding up loading and unloading” (para. 13) to minimize
passenger waiting times. Another example of an airline being responsive to customer
satisfaction is Southwest Airlines. Southwest’s Chief Operating Officer, Mike Van de Ven, (as
cited in McCartney, 2014a) stated, that “Southwest is upgrading baggage sorters and
equipment...at its major airports” (para. 23) in response to Southwest’s worst ACSI baggage
handling score “among the nine carriers in the scorecard...[which reflects] the heavy volume that
comes from not charging baggage fees but also the airline’s willingness to accept bags late for
check-in” (McCartney, 2014a, para. 22).
Airline administrators for Qantas Airways use the product differentiation strategy to
create a more premium experience for its premium class passengers by beginning “construction
on [a] new Domestic Business Lounge at Perth Airport...available to Qantas business class
customers, Platinum, and Platinum One Frequent Flyers” (“Australia: Qantas adds lounge
capacity in Perth with announcement of new business lounge,” 2014, para. 2). The domestic
Head of Customer Strategy for Qantas Airways, Philip Capps, (as cited in “Australia: Qantas
adds lounge capacity in Perth with announcement of new business lounge,” 2014) stated that its
dedicated Qantas precinct at Perth Airport “will deliver a better travel and airport experience for
Qantas customers as a result of improved gate access, faster security screening, quicker check in
and now more lounge facilities” (para. 4) equipped with premium facilities “which are...unique
[to] the domestic Australian market and [would] provide competitive differentiation” (para. 11).
These are premium profits available to administrators for full-service airlines who cater to the
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travelers who value the experience over low airfares in addition to safely arriving at their
destination.
Complexities in full-service airlines are found through its division of premium and
economy classes, an airline’s fleet, its cabin configuration, as well as an airline’s fare structure.
American Airlines had “pioneered complex, differentiated pricing, which had clearly been a
competitive advantage when it was introduced following the deregulation of the U.S. domestic
airlines industry” (Bonabeau, 2007, p. 68). According to Bonabeau (2007), “complexity is often
viewed as the cost of doing business, even as a means to obtaining a competitive advantage” (p.
67). While some low-cost carriers have attempted a simpler pricing structure such as with
Southwest Airlines, an attempt by American Airlines to simplify the pricing structure in April of
1992 resulted in “intense price competition from other airlines...destroying value for the entire
industry and forcing American Airlines to drop the [simplicity] plan within weeks” (Bonabeau,
2007, p. 68).
While cost leadership focuses on reducing costs, administrators implementing a product
differentiation strategy focus on delivering a positive and differentiated experience to the
passenger through customer contact employees and services offered by the airline. Complexity
within an airline’s structure can be important for the success of a full-service airline using the
product differentiation strategy in order for airline administrators to sufficiently differentiate
itself from its rivals. It remains critically important for airline administrators to be able to
respond effectively to customers when handling customer complaints. With today’s technology
and social media, one bad customer’s experience can translate into a negative impact on an
airline’s reputation. Global airline alliances in conjunction with frequent flyer programs are
ways for administrators for full-service airlines to attract and maintain its customer base.
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Additionally, non-price sensitive passengers who grow to expect to receive a positive experience
with an airline would be more likely to fly with that airline in the future.

Cost Leadership
Airline administrators utilizing the cost leadership business-level strategy are generally
administrators of low-cost carriers (LCCs) that cater to the price-sensitive travelers. The cost
leadership or cost advantage approach as described by Holloway (2008) notes that operators of
such airlines have lower costs than that of their rivals. This lower-cost approach can manifest
itself in two ways: benefit parity or benefit reduction (Holloway, 2008). Airline administrators
using the benefit parity approach offer the same benefits to their customers as their rivals, but at
a lower cost, allowing the airline administrators to capture a greater profit margin (Holloway,
2008). The other approach is benefit reduction, where the benefits offered by airline
representatives and managers are less than that of their competitors in an effort to reduce costs,
which may still appeal to the price-sensitive traveler who is mainly concerned about just getting
to their destination safely (Holloway, 2008). For both of these approaches to the cost leadership
business-level strategy, the reduction in costs allows the airline administrators to reduce the
prices that are charged to the customers, or travelers, to achieve a competitive advantage in the
mindset of the price-sensitive traveler.
Following the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, the United States was one of the first
countries to “witness the emergence of [low-cost] carriers (LCCs)…as a viable form of
commercial air transportation (Gross & Lück, 2013). The United States was especially suited for
this type of carrier because of its large spatial area of “over 9.5 million square kilometers,
[making it] the third largest country in the world by geographic size” (Gross & Lück, 2013, p.
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63). This business strategy was emulated with the introduction of new low-cost carriers in
Europe and Australia in the form of a completely new flight department, such as Ryanair in
Ireland, or a subsidiary of a major airline such as JetStar Airways, owned wholly by Qantas
Airways (Gross & Lück, 2011). Button (2014) described the low-cost carrier model, which is
the type of airline most likely to implement a cost leadership strategy, as the ‘Southwest effect’ –
basically the drop in fares that occur when a low-fare airline begins serving an airport that had
previously had no low-fare carriers.” The first successful airline to implement the low-cost
model was “Pacific Southwest Airlines...which pioneered the concept in 1949” (Button, 2014, p.
201). The airline administrators for low-cost carriers such as Southwest Airlines “seek to attract
traffic from competitors in the short term, while generating new traffic to cover their immediate
costs, with the hope of forcing traditional carriers from the market [so they can] enjoy some
degree of monopoly power” (Button, 2014, p. 203). Meanwhile, administrators for these lowcost carriers typically operate out of secondary airports and with point-to-point structures, which
has advantages in reducing congestion and are often without capacity restrictions (Gross & Lück,
2011).
Broad differentiation strategies employed by low-cost carriers “remove some elements of
cost from their production functions and reduce the levels of many of the remaining costs”
(Button, 2014, p. 204). This means that benefits that may be offered by full-service airlines may
be reduced as part of a benefit reduction strategy, which would have an effect on reducing the
operational costs of the airline. In some cases, airlines “charge separately for the attributes they
do offer, which vary among low-cost airlines” (Button, 2014, p. 204). A common example of
this benefit reduction approach of the cost leadership business-level strategy is that of Spirit
Airlines. Administrators for Spirit Airlines have chosen a kind of a-la-carte approach for its
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extremely price-sensitive travelers, who seek to get to their destination for the lowest possible
fare. Spirit Airlines’ “cut-rate fares include little more than a seat, with nearly everything else
sold a la carte...from boarding passes to drinking water” (Nicas, 2012, para. 1, 3).
Another example of the benefit reduction approach was introduced to Ryanair Ltd.,
which is headquartered in Dublin, Ireland, by Chief Executive Officer Michael O’Leary in 1991,
after studying the success of Southwest Airlines in the United States’ domestic travel market (as
cited in Barney & Hesterly, 2012). Like Southwest Airlines, airline administrators for Ryanair
chose to operate a uniform fleet of Boeing 737-800 aircraft in addition to saving costs in
installing non-reclining seats and removing window shades from their aircraft (Barney &
Hesterly, 2012). This strategy in addition to charging customers for ancillary fees in a similar
fashion to Spirit Airlines, such as for checked bags or onboard snacks, and enabling companies
to advertise space in the cabin of their aircraft, allow Ryanair’s airline administrators to earn a
comfortable profit margin despite having lower average fares than Southwest Airlines (Barney &
Hesterly, 2012).
These two examples are in stark contrast to the opposite end of the airline industry
spectrum – the full-service airlines that cater to the less price-sensitive passengers seeking an allinclusive and more comfortable flying experience. Unlike the full-service airlines, airlines such
as Ryanair focus on “gaining advantages by reducing its costs to below those of all its
competitors” (Barney & Hesterly, 2012, p. 104). The strategies employed by airline
administrators of Spirit Airlines and Ryanair Ltd have seen their share of controversy and
unpopularity as indicated by Spirit Airlines’ dismal score of 54 in 2015 by the American
Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) versus the airline industry benchmark average of 71, and a
survey of 4,000 readers on a TripAdvisor website that revealed Ryanair as the most disliked
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European airline (ACSI, 2015a; Barney & Hesterly, 2012). Additionally, Skytrax, which is an
international air travel ratings and reviews organization, finds both Ryanair and Spirit Airlines in
its two-star rating, which “signifies a poor standard of product and/or poor and inconsistent
standards of staff service delivery in the onboard or airport environments” (Skytrax, n.d., para.
2). These results from the American Customer Satisfaction Index, TripAdvisor, and Skytrax
indicate airline administrators are willing to sacrifice customer satisfaction for operating a nofrills airline and the profitability of these airlines indicate the most price-sensitive passengers are
willing to sacrifice comfort, flexibility and in some cases, convenience, for saving money.
Administrators for low-cost carriers are increasingly faced with the dilemma of whether
to base their competitive advantage solely on the lower price or have other factors that may
positively impact customer relations. In the information age of today with airline incidents or
accidents being a popular eye-catching breaking news heading in the mainstream media or with
social media giving each and every passenger the power to catapult complaints onto the
mainstream world stage, airline social and public relations teams are increasingly required to be
able to quickly respond and defuse a potential problem before it spirals out of control (Capozzi &
Rucci, 2013). One particular infamous example included the situation of passengers being
stranded on a JetBlue Airways aircraft for 14 hours on the runway in New York’s John F.
Kennedy International Airport in February of 2007, which was widely aired over mainstream and
social media and required a rapid and aggressive response directly from JetBlue Chief Executive
Officer David Neeleman (as cited in Capozzi & Rucci, 2013).
Another example involved a passenger who was deemed to be too large onboard a
Southwest Airlines flight, in which the passenger in question was transferred to a later flight.
This ignited a social media firestorm in which the communications team for Southwest Airlines
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had initially become defensive and then apologetic (Capozzi & Rucci, 2013). This highlights the
topic of seat width and the desire for airlines to seat as many passengers as possible within their
aircraft with the trend of shrinking seat widths, with an industry average of only 17 inches of
width for international flights (Ostrower & Michaels, 2013). Airline administrators need to
determine if the lower fare outweigh such strategies of balancing the balance sheet and risk
harming the reputation of the airline.
Another source of cost advantages, especially for a low-cost carrier is the economies of
scale. This term is defined by Barney and Hesterly (2012) as lower costs that are associated with
an increase in the size of a firm. Many airline administrators from both the cost leadership and
product differentiation sectors of the airline industry market have used this approach with the
mergers between United Airlines and Continental Airlines, Delta Air Lines and Northwest
Airlines, and American Airlines and US Airways. The decision to use a uniform fleet is typical
of low-cost carriers with 68% of 74 low-cost carriers around the world analyzed by Gross and
Lück (2013) “use only one type of aircraft, while 26 [percent] use two types, and 8 [percent] use
more than two different aircraft types” (p. 11). The Boeing 737 family of aircraft is the most
popular aircraft among the low-cost carriers, followed closely by the Airbus A320 family, with a
combined total of 65 out of the 74 analyzed carriers operating either the Boeing 737 or Airbus
A320 (Gross & Lück, 2013). Using a uniform fleet, maintenance and training costs are reduced,
fewer spare parts are required, and aircraft are more interchangeable should one aircraft be found
out of service.
According to the American Customer Satisfaction Index, the customer satisfaction gap
for travelers who pay for baggage fees versus those two do not have apparently closed, indicating
that there is a general, but grudging acceptance of such ancillary fees as the new normal (ACSI,
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2015a). With this new standard across the airline industry, airlines administrators for airlines
such as Southwest Airlines would gain a slight competitive advantage from continuing to not
charge baggage fees to their customers. Southwest Airlines has the added advantage of having
non-allocated seats, therefore minimizing passenger boarding and seating confusion, additional
revenue from passengers wishing to have priority boarding, and reducing time on the ground,
where the aircraft does not make the airline administrators any money (Gross & Schröder, 2007;
Pratley, 2003). Administrators for low-cost carriers prefer to avoid the integration of
connections, even within their own airline network to “avoid endangering punctual arrivals and
departures” (Gross & Schröder, 2007). However, there are options for passengers who wish to
continue to use the practice known as self-hubbing, in which there are numerous Internet travel
agency platforms such as Kayak or Expedia that can aid passengers in arranging connecting
flights at their own risk. In minimizing the turnaround time for aircraft meaning that the time the
aircraft is on the tarmac is shortened, the disadvantage relating to shorter flight durations with an
average of 2.5 to 3 hours is compensated (Gross & Schröder, 2007, p. 39).
In today’s modern airline industry, traditional full-service airlines are presenting
additional options to the traveling public in order to compete with the low-cost carriers by
modifying their existing product by “eliminating or cutting down on service elements from the
standard product’s profile , [such as] a switch to on-board sales of food and beverages [or
making] lower ticket prices contingent on more restrictive booking options” (Gross & Schröder,
2007, p. 13). For example, Delta Air Lines has adopted a fare class known as Basic Economy
with the most number of restrictions to passengers. Passengers under this rigid fare class can
make neither “advance seat selection nor itinerary changes…not even for an extra fee”, which
may deter families or couples wishing to sit together (Delta Air Lines, n.d.; Tuttle, 2014, para.
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5). Additionally, passengers under this fare class are unable to make any cancellations, which
would deter passengers who may have unexpected changes in their travel schedule (Delta Air
Lines, n.d.; Tuttle, 2014, para. 5).
Administrators for other airlines such as Deutsche Lufthansa AG, or simply Lufthansa
based out of Germany own a subsidiary known as Germanwings, which exists in the low-cost
carrier market “offering a budget product” (Gross & Schröder, 2007, p. 14) in addition to
offering a budget fare class known as Economy Basic in its parent airline, Lufthansa. This fare
class was implemented after the addition of a premium economy section, which is the trend in
many full-service airlines in which customers can pay extra in order to travel in more comfort
without the high expense of flying in business or first class. The approach for Lufthansa for this
fare class is to attract the price-sensitive travelers of Europe while attempting to maintain
customer loyalty through its mainline carrier (Lufthansa AG, n.d.).
Airline administrators implementing a cost leadership business-level strategy are facing
competition from not only other low-cost carriers, but also the traditional full-service airlines
seeking to implement both a premium and a budget service. While administrators for low-cost
carriers do not typically have the advantage of long-haul international flights, they have the
advantage of scheduling multiple short-haul flights per day, minimizing turnaround time by
configuring a uniform type of fleet and in many cases, such as with Southwest Airlines, have
non-allocated seats to speed up the boarding process. Airline administrators for both low-cost
carriers and full-service airlines respond to the increasing scrutiny from the traveling public, as
consumers become smarter and more informed with online platforms and tools such as web
search engines or social media platforms in which unhappy customers can easily announce their
grievances to the world at large.
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Shareholders and the U.S. Air Transport Industry
The air transport industry in the United States is a major contributor to the national
economy, improving productivity and creating over 11 million jobs in airlines and airports
around the country. This industry has enabled global trade and passenger movement in a safe,
economical, and efficient manner (Airlines for America, 2015). With a country as large as the
United States, traveling by air is a faster and more efficient form of transportation than traveling
by road or rail, making air travel more of a necessary activity rather than a luxury for longdistance trans-continental domestic or trans-oceanic long-haul travel.
An important element to note about the U.S. air transport industry is that cabotage is
prohibited by U.S. law under United States Code Title 49, Section 41703(c) (Navigation of
foreign civil aircraft, 2012). 49 U.S.C. Section 41703 states that foreign carriers may only fly
between two points within the United States under a set of emergency circumstances as outlined
in 49 U.S.C. Section 40109. This states that a foreign carrier can only operate between two
points within the United States if there is an emergency that does not arise out of normal
operating parameters and all efforts to accommodate traffic using U.S.-based carriers have been
exhausted regardless of whether the U.S. carriers in question are charging excessive fares (U.S.
Department of Transportation, 2011). From a customer perspective, this reduces the level of
competition from foreign sources, which may result in higher fares, but this lack of foreign
competition can be seen as a positive outlook for shareholders invested in the U.S.-based carriers
due to the limits on foreign influence on domestic market share of flight routes.
As a service industry, customer satisfaction is one of the most important indicators of an
airline’s performance. Additionally, the air transport industry is also heavily influenced by the
price fluctuations of crude oil due to the reliance on jet fuel for aircraft, as the costs for this fuel
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make up as much as one-third of an airline’s total expenses. These issues will be discussed in
more detail in addition to an in-depth analysis of seven of the major carriers in the United States
being Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, Spirit Airlines, Alaska Airlines, American Airlines,
Delta Air Lines, and United Airlines to compare and contrast elements of shareholder value
among the carriers.

Relationship between Customer Satisfaction and Shareholder Value

Table 1.
ACSI customer satisfaction levels for U.S. based airlines.

Source: Benchmarks by industry: Airlines by the American Customer Satisfaction Index
(ACSI), Ann Arbor, MI: Author. http://www.acsi.org
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According to a test performed by Anderson, Fornell, and Mazvancheryl (2004) on
“nearly 200 publicly traded Fortune 500 firms from 1994 to 1997,” (p. 172) there is a strong and
positive relationship between customer satisfaction as portrayed by the American Customer
Satisfaction Index (ACSI) and a measure known as Tobin’s Q. This Tobin’s Q, or Q-ratio is a
measure that was developed by Nobel laureate James Tobin of Yale University. Tobin had
hypothesized an “alternative to traditional financial measures of value by comparing the market
value of an asset to its replacement cost” (Damodaran, 2012, p. 537). By improving customer
satisfaction, this will reduce the volatility of the share price. This is attributed from a satisfied
customer base and greater customer retention, which leads to a more predictable source of future
cash flows and less volatility (Anderson, Fornell, & Mazvancheryl, 2004; Gruca & Rego, 2005).
Another connection shows that there is a more rapid market penetration for companies with
higher customer satisfaction numbers with a “ready market for new add-on services or productline extensions” (Anderson et al., 2004, p. 173). With higher customer satisfaction, customer
acquisition costs decline with positive word-of-mouth referrals and recommendations by
customers in addition to having greater resistance against downward pressure on prices
(Anderson et al., 2004).
A discounted cash flow model is one of the most accepted forms of a firm’s valuation,
often used by chief financial officers (CFOs), who utilize an estimate of the individual cash
flows, discount rate, and terminal value, all of which must be supported with reliable information
from a company’s financial data (Larrabee & Voss, 2012; Ryan & Ryan, 2002). Using this
model, there is a positive correlation between “the effects of customer satisfaction on customer
behavior [resulting] in increased cash flow growth and acceleration as well as a reduction in cash
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flow volatility” (Gruca & Rego, 2005, p. 115). These factors have a positive effect on
shareholder value with the stability and increase of cash flows.
As depicted in Table 1, the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) ranks the
airline satisfaction levels with the airline industry overall earning a score of 71 in 2015, which
was a 2.9% increase from the value in 2014 (ACSI, 2015b). A visual representation of how the

Figure 1. Components of the drivers of customer satisfaction.
Source: About ACSI: The science of customer satisfaction, Ann Arbor, MI: Author.
http://www.acsi.org
ACSI score is calculate is depicted in Table 1, where each of the determinants, being customer
expectations, perceived quality and perceived value are weighted and then measured to produce
the index score (ACSI, n.d.). This index, as translated back to customer satisfaction, is becoming
increasingly important in the age of social media, where “customers can spread stories of
happiness and unhappiness very quickly” (Sorensen, 2015, p. 13).
According to Sorensen (2015), there is a positive correlation between good customer
service, utilizing the components of kindness and empathy, and increased revenue through
ancillary sources. Sorensen (2015) defines empathy as understanding “another person’s
condition from their perspective” (p. 4) while observing others and using interpersonal skills to
determine what the person is thinking or feeling. This applies to empathy shown towards
customer from the front-line employees in addition to the empathy and understanding shown to
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the employees from management. There needs to be effective communication between uppermanagement executives and the front-line employees so that complexity is not added with the
addition of additional a-la-carte products when current training and resource infrastructure are
insufficient to sustain competent service (Sorensen, 2015). From another perspective, the lack of
empathy can cause negative publicity, especially in an era of social media and empowered
customers around the world. The United States Congress intervened in 1986 with the passage of
the Air Carrier Access Act, which was in response to the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in favor of
the airlines in continuing discriminatory behavior against disabled passengers (Sorensen, 2015;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 2003). More recently, the Department of Transportation had
to intervene in “protecting passengers from significant ground-based delays” (Sorensen, 2015, p.

Figure 2. ACSI stock portfolio vs. S&P 500.
Source: The ACSI as financial indicator by the American Customer Satisfaction Index
(ACSI). Ann Arbor, MI: Author.
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8) with the final rule on Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections requiring an option to allow
passengers to deplane after four hours on the tarmac, provided safety, security or ATC
exceptions do not prohibit that from occurring (U.S. DOT: Office of Aviation Enforcement and
Proceedings, 2015).
According to the ACSI stock portfolio as depicted in Figure 2, there is an obvious and
positive correlation between customer satisfaction and the performance of the stock price and
ultimately, shareholder value (ACSI, 2015c). The difference between the two grew more
apparent after December of 2008, when the trend of the ACSI stock portfolio grew sharply in
comparison to the S&P 500. With a service industry such as with the airlines, customer
satisfaction has a much greater impact than products with longer purchasing cycles, especially
with an increase in demand for air travel (Hart, 2007).

Relationship between Customer Satisfaction and Employee Satisfaction
The relationship between the variables of customer satisfaction and employee satisfaction
has been widely researched by managers and executives of companies big and small, and is often
viewed as critical to those in the service industry. The relationship between these two variables
has been noted to be enhanced by trust between the customer and contact employee, where the
employee demonstrates an honest effort to assist the customer in his or her needs (Beatty, Mayer,
Coleman, Reynolds, & Lee, 1996). When this is performed in conjunction with exceeding
customer expectations in empathy, assurance, and responsiveness, a deeper social and emotional
connection is made between the contact personnel and the customer, which is a major predictor
for increased customer loyalty (Beatty et al., 1996). This creates reciprocal positive
reinforcement and genuine appreciation from the customer, which in turn, is a source of
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employee satisfaction if in fact the employee was genuine in providing quality service (Beatty et
al., 1996; Jeon & Choi, 2012). A few examples of how airline contact personnel perform to
retain the loyalty of the customers, are through the frequent flyer programs, periodic gifts of
nominal value, and a dedicated service representative at the airport assigned individually to an
airline’s most valued customers to further increase the social and emotional connection between
the employee and the customer. The latter of these examples is known as relationship selling,
where specially trained employees are specifically assigned to one of the airline’s top tier
frequent flyer clientele or VIPs, which is rarely seen outside the realm of full-service airlines
using the product differentiation approach in an effort to further customize the passenger
experience (Beatty et al., 1996).
Employees, especially those in a contact personnel position must be sufficiently
motivated and feel like a part of a cohesive and efficient team, in which they are sufficiently
respected, rewarded, and recognized for their efforts in their company (Beatty et al., 1996). This
applies greatly to those in the positions to work with VIP customers, where the traits of
attentiveness, friendliness, empathy, and enthusiasm are especially important, which is
demonstrated most often with satisfied employees (Beatty et al., 1996; Jeon & Choi, 2012).
According to Beatty et al. (1996), it is important for companies to treat contact employees well,
or face the negative effects of lost revenue and customers through any kind of relationship
selling program. Employees have been shown to demonstrate reciprocity in providing quality
service to the customers when they perceive that they are treated well and fairly, and that they
have sufficient support from those in a leadership or supervisory role (Jeon & Choi, 2012).
Schneider and Bowen (as cited in Jeon & Choi, 2012) highlighted that “employee job
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satisfaction is positively related to customers’ perception of service” (p. 333) which then
improves employee retention and commitment towards the organization.

Performance Indicators of the Airline Industry

Break-even Load Factor

Figure 3. Load factor and break-even load factor for full-service airlines 2004-2014.
Source: Airline economic analysis by Hazel, Stalnaker, Taylor, & Usman, New York, NY:
Oliver Wyman.

There are many indicators that are used in the airline industry to measure performance of
the airline as a whole in terms of financial or overall standing, one of which is the break-even
load factor. The break-even load factor is the “number of seats that must be sold for [full-service
airlines] and [low-cost carriers] to break even” (Hazel, Stalnaker, Taylor, & Usman, 2014, p. 40).
According to Hazel et al. (2014), the average load factor for domestic operations for the first and
second quarter of 2014 was 85.6% while the load factor for 12 months ended July 2014 and July

COMPARISON OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE FSA VS LCC

48

2015 as reported by the Bureau of Transportation Statistics was 84.2% and 84.4%, respectively
(U.S. DOT: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015b).

Figure 4. Load factor and break-even load factor for low-cost carriers 2004-2014.
Source: Airline economic analysis by Hazel, Stalnaker, Taylor, & Usman, New York, NY: Oliver
Wyman.
According to Figures 3 and 4, which depict the comparisons between the load factor and
the break-even load factor in full-service airlines and low-cost carriers, there has been a cyclical
trend in the load factor as demand increases during certain segments of the calendar year,
especially around holidays, in a term that is called “load factor seasonality” (Hazel et al., 2014,
p. 42). While it is important to note that neither Figure 3 nor 4 take into account the ancillary
revenues from the airlines, examining Figure 3 for the full-service airlines, there has not been
much of a change in the peaks and troughs of the load factor. The break-even load factor for the
full-service airlines, however, has been consistently above the load factor for the majority of the
period from 2004 to 2014. Figure 3 in particular highlights the massive spike in the break-even
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load factor due to the rise in crude oil prices in 2008 to over $140 as shown in Figure 5 (Nasdaq
Stock Exchange, 2015). To highlight the data also in Figure 4, there is a significantly different
picture of the load factor being consistently higher than the break-even load factor for the 2004
to 2014 time period, except a spike in the break-even load factor in 2008 again due to the drastic

Figure 5. Historical price trend of crude oil, West Texas Intermediate (WTI) from 2006 to 2015
from the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX).
Source: End of day commodity futures price quotes for crude oil WTI (NYMEX) by the Nasdaq
Stock Exchange, New York: NY: Nasdaq.
increase in the price of crude oil. With both full-service and low-cost carriers, the dependence
on aviation fuel, and ultimately crude oil is a major factor in operating costs, “comprising over
30% of airline operating costs, [which is] the largest airline cost component” (Hazel et al., 2014,
p. 4). The more recent improvement in the margin between the load factor and the break-even
load factor can be attributed to rising air fares and relatively flat costs from less fuel price
volatility in 2014, showing a “standard deviation of the average jet fuel price [to be] only 4.0%
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for the year ended June 2014, compared with 11.3% during the prior 12-month period” (Hazel et
al., 2014, p. 11).
The data on the break-even load factor is broken down even further in Figure 6, which
depicts a comparison of the carriers based in the United States in regards to their margin in
between the respective airline’s load factor and the break-even load factor. As shown in Figure
6, it is clear that Spirit Airlines had the greatest gain in the second quarter of 2014, while United
Airlines had the lowest.

Figure 6. U.S. break-even load factor vs. load factor comparison (domestic) in 2014 Q2.
Source: Airline economic analysis by Hazel, Stalnaker, Taylor, & Usman, New York, NY:
Oliver Wyman.
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Available Seat Miles (ASMs)
The term of available seat miles is a common indicator used in the airline industry to
determine the number of seats that are available for sale on a particular flight multiplied by the
number of miles flown for that particular flight segment. These seats that are available for sale
are a revenue opportunity for airline administrators to achieve a goal of at least break-even on a
certain flight to make a decision on whether or not to continue servicing a certain route between
two city pairs. From a shareholder perspective, the available seat miles indicate which airlines
have the best potential for generating large amounts of revenue. Naturally, the particular
performance indicator favors the airlines operating under the revenue model rather than the cost
model, which is catered more towards the full-service airlines using the product differentiation
business-level strategy. According to Table 2, there has been steady growth in the number of
Table 2.
Available seat miles for U.S. carriers 2010-2014.

2010
American Airlines (premerger)
AA/US Airways (post-merger)
Delta Air Lines

165,420

Available Seat Miles (millions)
2011
2012
2013
167,828

2014

166,223

168,340
265,657
239,676

232,684

234,656

230,415

259,914
232,740

UAL/Continental

169,565

252,528

248,860

245,354

246,021

Southwest
JetBlue
Alaska Airlines
Spirit Airlines

98,437
34,744
27,736
8,120

120,579
37,232
29,627
9,353

128,137
40,075
31,428
11,344

130,344
42,824
33,672
13,861

131,004
44,994
36,078
16,340

Source: Adapted from 10-K SEC filings from American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United
Airlines, Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Alaska Airlines.
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available seat miles comparing the values from 2010 to the values in 2014. The post-merger
American Airlines had the greatest combination of seat availability and distance flown with over
265.6 billion available seat miles. It is interesting to note, however, that Alaska Airlines had the
least number of available seat miles, despite operating as a full-service airline, because of its
limited route structure in not offering trans-oceanic flights other than to Hawaii, and limited
diversity in its fleet. A more in depth analysis into Alaska Airlines will be discussed later in this
thesis.

Revenue Passenger Miles (RPMs)
Table 3.
Revenue passenger miles for U.S. carriers 2010-2014.

2010
American Airlines (premerger)
AA/US Airways (post-merger)
Delta Air Lines
UAL/Continental
Southwest
JetBlue
Alaska Airlines
Spirit Airlines

134,298
193,169
140,857
78,047
28,279
22,841
6,664

Revenue Passenger Miles (millions)
2011
2012
2013
136,386
192,767
207,531
97,583
30,698
25,032
8,007

136,620

138,878

192,974
205,485
102,875
33,563
27,007
9,664

215,541
194,988
205,167
104,348
35,836
28,833
12,001

2014

217,870
202,925
205,559
108,035
37,813
30,718
14,159

Source: Adapted from 10-K SEC filings from American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United
Airlines, Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Alaska Airlines.
Another common performance indicator used in the air transport industry is known as
revenue passenger miles (RPMs). This is an indicator that is often compared against the number
of available seat miles as mentioned in the previous section. This is because the number of
revenue passenger miles divided by the number of available seat miles gives the load factor, or in
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layman’s terms, what percentage of seats are filled in the airplane on average throughout the
year. The revenue passenger miles (RPMs) is calculated by multiplying the number of revenue
passengers, or paying customers, by the number of miles that are flown. Just like with the
number of available seat miles, this is another performance metric that favors airlines that
operate under the revenue model and have the economies of scale with a large and diverse fleet
to operate a wide range of routes from short-haul domestic to long-haul international flights.
According to Table 3, post-merger American Airlines tops the list again in 2014 with
over 217.8 billion revenue passenger miles, followed by United-Continental with over 205.5
billion RPMs and Delta Air Lines with over 202.9 billion RPMs. Alaska Airlines again ranks in
revenue passenger miles in terms of the airlines targeted in this thesis. This is again because of
its limited route structure in not providing trans-oceanic flights other than to Hawaii.

Cost per Available Seat Mile (CASM)
Besides the available seat miles and the revenue passenger miles, the cost per available
seat mile (CASM) is another common measurement used in the air transport industry. This is
obtained by dividing the total operating costs of the airline in question by the number of
available seat miles. Unlike the previous two performance indicators, this measurement favors
airlines that focus more on a cost model and cost leadership business-level strategy rather than
the revenue model or product differentiation approach. Also unlike the previous two indicators
is that a lower number for the cost per available seat mile is more favorable for the airline in
question as opposed to a higher number for the available seat miles or the revenue passenger
miles. Naturally, the three low-cost carriers measured in Table 4 have the lowest cost per
available seat mile with a cost of just over 14 cents per available seat mile for Southwest
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Airlines, just under 13 cents for JetBlue Airways and a little over 9 cents per available seat mile
for Spirit Airlines. It is important to note that although this exemplifies the effort of low-cost
carriers in using the cost leadership business-level strategy to gain a competitive advantage, this
does not suggest that the full-service airlines adopting a product differentiation approach do not
care about their costs. Ultimately, the higher the cost of operating the flights, the less income
there is for the company, and also the less return on value there is for the shareholder.
Table 4.
Cost per available seat mile for U.S. carriers 2010-2014.
CASM (Cost per available seat mile)
American Airlines (premerger)
AA/US Airways (post-merger)
Delta Air Lines
UAL/Continental
Southwest
JetBlue
Alaska Airlines
Spirit Airlines

2010

2011

2012

$0.1340

$0.1429

$0.1495

$0.1365
$0.1376
$0.1230
$0.1088
$0.1382
$0.0877

$0.1496
$0.1470
$0.1299
$0.1210
$0.1457
$0.0991

$0.1591
$0.1493
$0.1334
$0.1243
$0.1482
$0.1009

2013

2014

$0.1589
$0.1623
$0.1560
$0.1356
$0.1271
$0.1531
$0.0990

$0.1605
$0.1684
$0.1581
$0.1420
$0.1293
$0.1488
$0.0965

Source: Adapted from 10-K SEC filings from American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United
Airlines, Southwest Airlines, JetBlue Airways, and Alaska Airlines.
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Shareholder Value for Low-Cost Carriers in the United States

Figure 7. Comparison of categories of revenue per segment passenger for U.S. carriers.
Source: Airline economic analysis by Hazel, Stalnaker, Taylor, & Usman, New York, NY: Oliver
Wyman.

Low-cost carriers (LCCs) attract the price sensitive traveler who value low prices over a
better overall travel experience. LCCs in the United States include Southwest Airlines, Spirit
Airlines, and JetBlue Airways. These carriers adopt a cost leadership approach to reduce the
operational costs of the airline in order to provide cheaper fares to the passengers. Elements of
service quality as noted by Leong et al. (2015) include tangibles, reliability, responsiveness,
assurance, and empathy. With a strictly low-cost carrier offering low fares by adopting the cost
leadership strategy, it is not reasonable to expect some differentiated premium-level tangibles in
the form of business or first class cabins or dedicated VIP airport lounges.
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Within the low-cost carriers, there exists the ultra-low cost carriers such as Spirit Airlines
and Allegiant. Unlike Southwest Airlines or JetBlue Airways, Spirit Airlines and Allegiant
obtain much of their revenue from ancillary sources due to the small profit margins for the airline
seat, as these carriers try to capture the most price-sensitive travelers. As shown in Figure 7,
Spirit Airlines had the largest percentage of revenue compared to the other carriers attributed to
ancillary revenues, being 36.2% and including ancillaries such as reservation change fees,
baggage fees, or miscellaneous fees. Miscellaneous fees are a broad category that include a-la-

Figure 8. Seats needed to be sold to break-even and revenue potential for network carriers
(full-service airlines) and value carriers (low-cost carriers).
Source: Airline economic analysis by Hazel, Stalnaker, Taylor, & Usman, New York, NY:
Oliver Wyman.

carte on-board meals, on-board wireless internet, priority boarding, in-flight entertainment,
pillows, blankets, and in some cases, credit card and boarding pass printing fees (Hazel et al.,
2014). The latter two fees are attributed more towards the ultra-low cost carriers Spirit and
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Figure 9. 2015 North America airline satisfaction study: Low-cost carrier rankings.
Source: http://www.jdpower.com/press-releases/2015-north-america-airline-satisfaction-study
Allegiant, the latter of which, Allegiant, pocketed 24.2% of its revenue or an average of $45.23
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per passenger from ancillary fees (Hazel et al., 2014).
Figure 8 depicts the number of seats that must be sold for both the low-cost carriers and
full-service airlines to break even. The illustration in Figure 8 assumes the same break-even load
factor for all classes of service and “any differences between actual and break-even passenger
levels are distributed between the two cabins in proportion to the number of seats in each” (Hazel
et al., 2014, p. 40).

Southwest Airlines
Southwest Airlines (“Southwest”) is a low-cost carrier is based out of Dallas Love Field
in Dallas, Texas and is led by Chief Executive Officer Gary Kelly. Through its mission of
excelling in “customer service delivered with a sense of warmth, friendliness, individual pride,
and company spirit” (“About Southwest.,” 2015, para. 1), Southwest’s airline administrators
deliver shareholder value. This dedication to service instilled through the company mission is
highlighted in the customer satisfaction rankings for both J.D. Power and the American
Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI). According to ACSI, Southwest has a score of 78, which is
only second from JetBlue Airways and higher than all of the full-service airlines based in the
United States (ACSI, 2015b). This same ranking is reflected through J.D. Power as indicated in
Figure 9, with Southwest Airlines again ranked second behind JetBlue Airways with a score of
781 out of 1,000 and a J.D. Power Circle Rating of ‘better than most’ in terms of the low-cost
carriers (J.D. Power, 2015a).
With the help of Southwest’s reputation for its low air ticket fares and strong passenger
travel demand, airline administrators reported an earnings per share of $1.03 during the June
2015 period (Henigson, 2015d). This amounted to $691 million in earnings, making it the
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highest in Southwest’s 48-year history (Henigson, 2015d). According to the United States
Department of Transportation’s Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2015a), airline
administrators for Southwest earned $108.9 billion in revenue passenger miles domestically for
12 months ending in July 2015, which was an increase from $95.67 billion for 12 months ending
in July 2014. This was in addition to a market share of 17.8%, which again, was an increase from
the 2014 figure of 16.3% (U.S. DOT: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015a, 2015b).
Southwest has shown growth in the number of passengers carried and the total number of

Figure 10. Southwest Airlines Value Line report (August 2015).
Source: Value Line Research Center – Investment Survey. http://www.valueline.com

departures from 2014 to 2015 being 121 million to 135.9 million passengers and 1.1 million to
1.2 million departures, respectively (U.S. DOT: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2015a).
Southwest Airlines operates only variants of the Boeing 737 family of aircraft to improve
operational efficiencies. Southwest’s airline administrators have placed orders for the new
Boeing 737 MAX aircraft and the Boeing Next-Generation 737 aircraft to optimize the operating
performance and reduce operating costs in an effort to modernize their fleet (Southwest Airlines,
2014). In relation to the Boeing 737 MAX in particular, the new aircraft offers 8% lower
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operating costs, 1.8% less fuel consumption, lower airframe maintenance costs, and 300 to 500
more nautical miles of range than its closest competitor (The Boeing Company, 2015). From a
shareholder perspective, these lower operating costs have the opportunity to increase the net
profit of the airline and the longer range of the aircraft opens up the possibility of Southwest’s
airline administrators to create new routes to more locations, while increasing market share,
especially with a planned growth in the total fleet by 2 percent in 2016 (PR Newswire, 2015). A
meeting held by the Board of Directors for Southwest Airlines determined an increase in the
quarterly dividends by 25% and authorized a $1.5 billion share re-purchase initiative (PR
Newswire, 2015). In terms of risk, Southwest Airlines has the highest rating out of the U.S.
based airlines examined in this thesis, with a rating of BBB by Standard and Poor’s (Standard
and Poor’s, 2015c). This rating by S&P demonstrates that Southwest has “adequate protection
parameters [but] adverse economic conditions or changing circumstances are more likely to lead
to a weakened capacity of [Southwest] to meet its financial commitment” (Standard and Poor’s,
2014, para. 9) compared to S&P’s AAA, AA, or A-ratings. This would be the case for any
airline, due to the industry’s reliance on aviation fuel and the sometimes-volatile nature of the
prices of crude oil. However, this effect was dampened by the improvement of the fuel
efficiency of Southwest’s operations and aircraft with the use of ground power at airports, the
control of aircraft ground idle speeds, equipping pilots with tablets in place of paper charts and
manuals, and the installation of winglets on 39 of their Boeing 737-800 aircraft (Southwest
Airlines, n.d.). According to the Value Line Investment Survey, Southwest Airlines, as depicted
in Figure 10 has a safety rank of 3 on a scale of 1 through 5 with 1 being the least risky and most
stable investments, while 5 represents the riskiest investments (Henigson, 2015d). This places
Southwest in the average risk category, which is measured relative to approximately 1,700 other
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stocks (Henigson, 2015d; Value Line Research Center, 2015). Southwest’s timeliness of 1 ranks
it in the top 100 stocks in terms of relative price performance in the upcoming six to twelve
months while the technical rank of 4 indicates a below average short-term, 3-6 month price
return in the same ranking of 1 through 5 (Henigson, 2015d; Value Line Research Center, 2015).
With a price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio of 11.7, it means that shareholders are willing to pay $11.70
for every dollar of Southwest Airlines’ earnings. Southwest Airlines also highlights a dividend
yield of 0.7% as indicated in Figure 10, which is the amount that Southwest Airlines would pay
annually in dividends relative to its price per share of $40.19. The price-to-earnings ratio and the
fact that Southwest Airlines’ administrators are paying out dividends places Southwest at an
advantage from a shareholder perspective.

Spirit Airlines
Spirit Airlines is an ultra-low cost carrier that is based out of Miramar, Florida, that
adopts a strict cost leadership business-level strategy that attracts the ultra price-sensitive
travelers. This demographic of passengers that Spirit Airlines administrators are trying to attract
are those that are looking to simply travel from their point of origin to their destination for the

Figure 11. Spirit Airlines Value Line report (August 2015).
Source: Value Line Research Center – Investment Survey. http://www.valueline.com

COMPARISON OF SHAREHOLDER VALUE FSA VS LCC

62

Table 5.
Spirit Airlines financial data.

Source: Form 10-K: Annual report pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 by Spirit Airlines. Miramar, FL: Author.
lowest possible unbundled fare (Spirit Airlines, 2014). As is common with low cost carriers,
Spirit Airlines has a fleet composed of only Airbus A320 aircraft with common flight crews to
reduce the operational costs from training, maintenance, and inventory. According to the
American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) scores depicted in Table 1, Spirit Airlines ranked
last with a score of only 54. Despite efforts for Spirit Airlines’ administrators, it would seem
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that the customer expectations do not align with the perceived quality and value that the airline
administrators are trying to offer. Administrators for Spirit Airlines obtain much of their revenue
from ancillary sources as shown in Table 5 under non-ticket operating revenues. In an industry
where customers expect lower ticket prices, causing lower profit margins for the basic airline
seat, non-ticket revenue, as in the case of Spirit Airlines, have contributed between 40 and 41
percent between the years of 2012 and 2014, which was up from 35.6% in 2011 and 31.14% in
2010 (Spirit Airlines, 2014). From an October 2015 report issued by Spirit Airlines, “adjusted
net income for the third quarter [of] 2015 increased 31.6 percent to $97.3 million ($1.35 per
diluted share) compared to the third quarter [of] 2014” (Spirit Airlines, 2015, para. 1). In
addition to the increase in net income, administrators for Spirit Airlines have also reported an
increase in cash and cash equivalents, measured in a nine-month period from January to
September of 2014 and 2015, from $588,474 to $748,896 (Spirit Airlines, 2015). These figures
signify growth in the airline, which is attractive to shareholders because it increases the value of
the shares in addition to the increase in cash assets increases the safety margin in terms of being
able to pay off the airline’s short-term debt obligations.
According to the financial data depicted in Figure 11, Spirit Airlines has the same level of
risk as shown in the safety ranking, as Southwest Airlines, with an average risk score of 3 on a
scale of 1 through 5 (Henigson, 2015e). Spirit Airlines, additionally has the same timeliness
rank as Southwest Airlines, being in the top 100 of stocks measured by the Value Line Research
Center as having the best relative performance within six to twelve months. Also shown in
Figure 11 is the price-to-earnings ratio of 14.1, meaning that investors are willing to spend
$14.10 for every dollar of earnings that is made by Spirit Airlines. The fact that Spirit Airlines
does not pay out dividends places the ultra-low cost airline at a slight disadvantage from a
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shareholder investment point of view, but the money that would have otherwise gone to the
shareholder would have been reinvested back into the airline to help with growth and expansion.

JetBlue Airways

Figure 12. JetBlue Airways Value Line report.
Source: Value Line Research Center – Investment Survey. http://www.valueline.com

JetBlue Airways (JetBlue) is a low-cost carrier that is adopting a hybrid model of both
the cost leadership and product differentiation business-level strategies. JetBlue Airways is
based out of New York City, operates a fleet of Airbus A320, A321, and Embraer 190 aircraft,
and operates flights domestically, Latin America and to destinations in the Caribbean (JetBlue
Airways, 2014a). Unlike an ultra-low cost carrier, JetBlue offers free in-flight entertainment,
snacks, and non-alcoholic beverages within its core service, while still offering additional
products, services and amenities at an extra charge, for expedited security, alcoholic beverages,
and JetBlue’s EvenMore™ Space seats (JetBlue Airways, 2014a). JetBlue ranks first among all
airlines measured by the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI), with a score of 81 as
shown in Table 1.
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According to an investor update issued by JetBlue Airways, airline administrators have
announced new routes between city pairs, to begin in the first and second quarters of 2016, and
to include international routes from Fort Lauderdale to Quito, Ecuador and Barbados (JetBlue
Airways, 2015). Additionally, airline administrators are looking to attract both leisure and

Figure 13. Value Line annual returns per timeliness rankings.
Source: The Value Line ranking system by the Value Line Investment Center.
http://www.valueline.com

business travelers with an average current seat pitch of 34.7 inches across its fleet, a frequent
flyer rewards program known as TrueBlue, and a premium class cabin for trans-continental
flights known as Mint (JetBlue Airways, 2014b). This ‘customer sweet spot’ is between high
value leisure customers and those with mixed wallets, a midpoint between the ultra-price
sensitive and the road warriors, where in attracting the less price-sensitive customers, JetBlue
Airways administrators can earn a greater amount of revenue per departure for transcontinental
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flights such as from John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK) in New York to Los Angeles
International Airport (JetBlue Airways, 2014b). Airline administrators are also taking advantage
of newer fuel efficient aircraft to reduce reliance and costs on aircraft fuel. The new Airbus
A321neo aircraft that will be implemented in between 2018 and 2021 boasts 17-19% greater fuel
efficiency than the current A320 aircraft in JetBlue Airways’ fleet (JetBlue Airways, 2014b).
According to Figure 12, JetBlue Airways shares the same Value Line safety ranking as
Southwest and Spirit Airlines, placing all of the low-cost carriers researched in this thesis in the
average risk category from an investment perspective (Henigson, 2015c). In a slight contrast, the
Standard and Poor’s rating agency rated JetBlue Airways with a ranking of B+, which was an
upgrade from a rating B in May of 2015 (Snyder & Baggaley, 2015). This rating was upgraded
due to the increased stability of JetBlue Airways’ financial outlook with a reduction in debt and
improved operating performance (Snyder & Baggaley, 2015). A further upgrade in the rating is
possible if the funds-from-operations (FFO) to debt ratio reaches a sustainable 40% by airline
administrators continuing to reduce the amount of debt (Snyder & Baggaley, 2015). According
to Standard and Poor’s, the B+ rating informs investors that the company currently has the
ability to fulfill its financial commitments, but negative business, economic, or financial
conditions will likely impair that ability to fulfill those obligations (Standard and Poor’s, 2014).
Unlike the previous two airlines, however, JetBlue has a timeliness ranking of 2, which still
remains a better-than-average ranking compared to 1,700 other stocks measured by the Value
Line Research Center. Figure 13 depicts both the cumulative and per annum return for each
timeliness ranking group, which shows that the stocks that are ranked in Group 1 have the
greatest per annum return of 13.4%, followed by a distant 9.2% for stocks ranked in Group 2.
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Shareholder Value for Full-Service Airlines in the United States
Full-service airlines adopt a product differentiation approach to gain a competitive
advantage in the dynamic airline transport industry. Some of the U.S. airlines adopting this
approach include Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, United Airlines, and Alaska Airlines.
These airlines, through their product differentiation business-level strategy, cater to the traveling
public who value the travel experience more than simply traveling from the point of origin to the
destination at the cheapest possible fare. From an overall business-level strategy perspective,
tangibles make up one of the primary elements of customer satisfaction that would set a fullservice airline apart from a low-cost carrier to the less price-sensitive traveler. Tangibles is
defined as “the appearance of physical facilities, equipment, personnel and communication
materials” (p. 6623) that would apply to the design and layout of the onboard cabins and airport
lounges, and would have a “significant and positive influence on customer satisfaction” (Leong
et al., 2015, p. 6623). According to Babbar and Koufteros (2008), the service provided by the
front-line or contact employees, form the perspective and experience the customer has about the
airline. With a full-service airline looking to differentiate itself from the competition with the
quality of the product, the contact employees need to demonstrate “individual attention,
helpfulness, courtesy, and promptness embedded in the element of personal touch” (Babbar &
Koufteros, 2008, p. 824) to enhance customer satisfaction.
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Source: http://www.jdpower.com/press-releases/2015-north-america-airline-satisfaction-study
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Delta Air Lines

Figure 15. Delta Air Lines Value Line report.
Source: Value Line Research Center – Investment Survey. http://www.valueline.com

Delta Air Lines (Delta) is a full-service airline headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia,
operating a wide range of domestic and international flights out of one of its main hubs in cities
such as Atlanta, New York, Detroit, Boston, Amsterdam, Paris, and Tokyo to name a few. As a
full-service airline operating a product differentiation business-level strategy, Delta operates a
hub and gateway network while also being a member of the SkyTeam global airline alliance
(Delta Air Lines, 2014). Administrators for Delta Air Lines are leveraging the scale of its
domestic and international network to provide better revenue efficiency and by establishing
greater consolidation, Delta can increase revenues by approximately 20% on “20% fewer
departures, 6% fewer seats, and 12% fewer aircraft since the merger [with Northwest Airlines]”
(Delta Air Lines, 2015, p. 3).
Comparing a 12-month period ending in the second quarter of 2014 and 2015, the return
on investment capital (ROIC) increased from 18.2% to 23.5%, and the operating cash flow
increased 18% from $5.4 billion to $6.3 billion for the same measured time period (Delta Air
Lines, 2015). Administrators for Delta Air Lines have also authorized a new $5 billion
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repurchase program through 2017 to return cash back to the shareholders, which provides
shareholder value. In this initiative, Delta has returned “over $3 billion in less than two years
[and] will [continue to] return at least 50% of free cash flow to shareholders” (Delta Air Lines,
2015, p. 11). The adjusted net debt for Delta Air Lines for 2013 and 2014 was $9.4 billion and
$7.3 billion, respectively, which represents and highlights Delta’s administrator’s attempts to
lower the airline’s net debt to $4 billion (Delta Air Lines, 2015). This increases the stability and
lowers the financial risk for the company in its ability to fulfill its debt obligations. This is also
in light of a an upgrade in Delta Air Lines’ rating by the credit rating agency, Standard and
Poor’s (S&P), to BB+ (Caminiti, 2015; Standard and Poor’s, 2014). This new rating for Delta
Air Lines was upgraded to only one level below investment grade because of the airline’s
“strong earnings and cash flow…[allowing] Delta to significantly pay down its debt, while
returning cash to shareholders via dividend payouts and share buybacks” (Caminiti, 2015, para.
3). In comparison, the safety ranking of Delta Air Lines according to the Value Line Research
Center according to Figure 15 placed the airline in the average category among 1,700 stocks that
were measured. However, Delta Air Lines earned a timeliness rating of 1, placing the airline in
the top 100 stocks as compared with the same 1,700 stocks (Downing, 2015a).
In terms of customer satisfaction, according to Table 1, Delta earned an ACSI score of 71
which was equal to the airline industry average, which was the second highest out of the fullservice airlines. To support this ranking, J.D. Power’s ranking perspective as illustrated in
Figure 14 showed that Delta Air Lines was ranked as second among the full-service airlines, or
traditional carriers with a score of 709 compared to Alaska Airlines’ score of 719. According to
the Power Circle rankings also illustrated in Figure 14, Delta earned a ranking of ‘better than
most’ among the North America-based airlines (J.D. Power, 2015b).
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American Airlines

Figure 16. American Airlines Value Line report.
Source: Value Line Research Center – Investment Survey. http://www.valueline.com

American Airlines is a full-service airline in the United States that is headquartered out of
Fort Worth, Texas and operates a diverse fleet and a comprehensive domestic and international
route network. The airline was one of the later airlines in the U.S. air transport industry to
emerge from bankruptcy, when it also started trading again on Nasdaq on December 9th of 2013
with an initial price of $26.40 (Trefis Team, 2014). American Airlines’ emergence from Chapter
11 bankruptcy allowed administrators to cut costs that would otherwise not be possible through
the re-negotiation of contracts with airline employees, office and aircraft lease contracts, and the
limiting of pension liabilities (Trefis Team, 2014). With American Airlines’ merger with US
Airways, the increase in the airline’s route network and coverage is attractive to travelers that
seek frequent flyer status with an airline in an effort to earn free travel or premium benefits
through one of American Airlines’ top-tier levels. This increased coverage involves greater
interconnectivity between cities along the east coast of the United States with the help of the
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former US Airways presence in Philadelphia, Charlotte, and the capital city of Washington D.C.
(Trefis Team, 2014).
According to Figure 16, due to the relatively recent emergence from Chapter 11
bankruptcy, there is little historical data on the performance on the stock, in addition to the lack
of a timeliness or technical ranking. However, American Airlines earned a safety ranking of 3,
which placed the airline in the average risk category along with all of the previously mentioned
airlines in this thesis. However, the airline has a relatively low price-to-earnings ratio of only
5.7, meaning that shareholders are only willing to pay $5.70 for every dollar of earnings
(Henigson, 2015b).

United Airlines
United Airlines is a full-service airline headquartered out of Chicago, Illinois with a
comprehensive domestic and international route structure and a founding member of the Star
Alliance. United Airlines operates a wide variety of Airbus and Boeing aircraft from the smaller
Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 to the Boeing 747-400 and Boeing 787 aircraft. As is the strategy
for full-service airlines, the wide diversity of the airline’s fleet helps United’s airline
administrators operate flight from short-haul domestic to long-haul international flights. This
strategy in conjunction with offering premium classes of service both at the airport and onboard
the aircraft demonstrate a product differentiation business-level strategy approach within the
executive leadership of United Airlines.
Since the merger between United Airlines and Continental Airlines in 2010 to become
United Continental Holdings Inc., the airline has experienced numerous problems, from
computer glitches, to frustrated employees and poor customer satisfaction levels (Carey & Nicas,
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2015; Mouawad & White, 2015). In comparison to other full-service airlines such as Delta Air
Lines or American Airlines, United Airlines has experienced significant delays and has taken
longer to integrate the computer systems of its native software and the Shares system of the
former Continental Airlines. (Carey & Nicas, 2015; Mouawad & White, 2015). This had a
negative effect on customer satisfaction, especially with the global grounding of United Airlines’
fleet in July of 2015 due to a computer malfunction and a faulty router (Carey & Nicas, 2015).
Poor customer satisfaction is reflected in the ACSI score of 60 as depicted in Table 1, which is
the lowest-ranked full-service airline, and third from the bottom of the list. According to the
U.S. Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Bureau of Transportation Statistics (2015a), United
Airlines had only 73% of departures and 76% of arrivals on time, which ranked the airline as 13th
and 12th, respectively. With the miscommunication, distrust, and general poor relationship
between management and the front-line employees, the customers ended up suffering the brunt
of the airline’s failures (Mouawad & White, 2015).
With United Airlines as a full-service airline, its airline administrators are at a
disadvantage due to its strategy of cutting employee wages, frequent flyer benefits, and
squeezing in slimmer seats on board their aircraft, without the operational cost efficiencies of a
true low-cost carrier. It is not a sustainable strategy for a long-term investment, which is further
reflected in the airline’s financial data. According to the annual report for United Airlines, the
airline, in 2014 had current assets of $8.18 billion and current liabilities of $12.51 billion, which
calculates into a current ratio of only 0.65 (United Continental Holdings Inc., 2014).
Considering the current ratio in previous years, using the same current ratio formula of current
assets divided by current liabilities, the company’s current ratio decreased from 0.78 in 2012, to
0.71 in 2013 before reaching the current ratio of 0.65 for 2014 (United Continental Holdings
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Inc., 2014). The reduction in the current ratio was not due to a significant increase in current
liabilities, but rather a decrease in current assets, particularly in the “total unrestricted cash, cash
equivalents and short-term investments [and] receivables” (United Continental Holdings Inc.,
2014, p. 59). The decrease in this type of asset clearly shows that the airline administrators have
less liquid cash reserves which are not connected to any one particular use and for use to cover
short-term debt obligations. This increases the risk and decreases the stability of the company,
especially with an industry that is heavily affected by crude oil prices and high fixed costs.

Figure 17. United Airlines Value Line report.
Source: Value Line Research Center – Investment Survey. http://www.valueline.com

According to Figure 17, United Continental Holdings, which is the holding company for
United Airlines, scored a safety ranking of 4, which was the lowest of all the airlines measured
within the scope of this thesis, to include both the low-cost carriers and the full-service airlines
(Downing, 2015b). This ranking suggests that United Continental is scored below-average in
terms of the safety of investment from a risk perspective, or in other words, United Continental is
a riskier-than-average investment for a shareholder. This ranking is corroborated through United
Airlines’ credit rating through Standard and Poor’s, with a grade of BB-, meaning that although
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the company is less vulnerable to non-payment, there are major uncertainties or susceptibility to
negative financial, business, or economic conditions (Standard and Poor’s, 2014, 2015b).

Alaska Airlines
Alaska Airlines is a full-service airline in the United States that is headquartered in
Seattle, Washington, and is operated through its parent company, Alaska Air Group. Alaska
Airlines operates a fleet of variants of the Boeing 737 to Hawaii, Alaska, the 48 contiguous
states, Canada, Mexico, and Costa Rica. Unlike some other major full-service airlines in the
United States, Alaska Airlines does not operate trans-Atlantic flights nor flights to Asia, and is
not part of any global airline alliance, but instead focuses on a strong and positive brand image
and ensuring that the airline’s current routes are profitable (Kalb, 2013). Employees, especially
contact personnel for Alaska Airlines have performed to high standards regarding implementing
customer satisfaction initiatives, and managers for the airline have also implemented employee
satisfaction initiatives through $116 million in incentive pay for reaching “safety, customer
service, operational, and financial goals” (Alaska Air Group Inc., 2014, p. 4). The emphasis on

Figure 18. Alaska Airlines Value Line report.
Source: Value Line Research Center – Investment Survey. http://www.valueline.com
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employee and customer satisfaction has resulted in being ranked as first in the ACSI rating out of
the full-service airlines shown in Table 1 as well as first among J.D. Power’s ranking of airline
satisfaction for traditional carriers (J.D. Power, 2015b).
According to Figure 18, Alaska Airlines earned a safety ranking of 3, which placed it in
with all of the U.S.-based carriers except for United Airlines in terms of the risk of the
investment in the airline (Henigson, 2015a). Despite Alaska Airlines’ high share price of $81.51
and relatively high price-to-earnings ratio of $13.00 compared to other U.S.-based carriers, the
airline only earned a timeliness score of 2. Although this placed Alaska Airlines above average
among Value Line’s 1,700 stocks for short-term six to twelve-month performance, it was
apparently ranked lower than all of the other airlines researched in this thesis except for JetBlue
Airways. It is interesting to note that despite this ranking, both JetBlue Airways and Alaska
Airlines have score highest among the U.S.-based low-cost carriers and full-service airlines,
respectively, on customer satisfaction according to ACSI and J.D. Power. To support Alaska
Airlines’ financial strength, however is a rating of BBB- by the credit rating agency Standard and
Poor’s (Standard and Poor’s, 2015a). This rating is one of the investment-grade ratings,
indicating that adverse external circumstances could weaken the company’s capacity to make its
financial commitments, but has sufficiently displayed enough protection parameters to reduce the
amount of negative speculation for the airline (Standard and Poor’s, 2014).
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Findings and Conclusion
Despite the different business-level strategies implemented by carriers based in the
United States, there appears not to be enough reliable evidence on whether a low-cost carrier
provides more shareholder value than a full-service airline, or vice versa. One of the long-term
strategies implemented by airlines such as JetBlue Airways, Southwest Airlines, and Alaska
Airlines have been to build high customer satisfaction, in order to gain repeat customers and
positive referrals from customer-to-customer to gain a more sustainable market share. At the
same time, while low-cost carrier Southwest Airlines is performing well in terms of customer
satisfaction, another low-cost carrier, Spirit Airlines is scored in last place among carriers based
in the United States according to the American Customer Satisfaction Index with a score of only
54 as compared to the airline industry average of 71. In addition to this, there is a connection
between the customer satisfaction levels and employee satisfaction. Administrators for United
Airlines, who have had difficult in negotiating labor contracts with its employee in the aftermath
of the airline’s Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing has resulted in disengaged employees that has
affected the quality of service that they provide, affecting customer satisfaction, and ultimately a
segment of competitive advantage. With a new Chief Executive Officer, Oscar Munoz, at the
helm of the airline who emphasizes the value of the people in the company, it remains to be seen
how United Airlines will perform in the long-term outlook.
Airline administrators must remain vigilant to include other stakeholders that are not
shareholders, especially with employees who serve as the representative and front-line staff for
the airline. In a service industry such as the air transport industry, it is clear that disengaged and
unmotivated employees have a very detrimental effect on customer satisfaction. This is
particularly notable in the case of United Airlines, where airline administrators and front-line
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employees are still reeling from the effects of the bankruptcy filings from 2002 to 2006 due to
the loss of employee pensions. The correlation of employee satisfaction to customer satisfaction
is clear through the ranking of United Airlines in the American Customer Satisfaction Index
(ACSI) and the J.D. Power North America airline satisfaction study where it ranks last among
the full-service airlines. Another example is with Spirit Airlines, where it ranks last among all of
the carriers measured by the American Customer Satisfaction Index (ACSI) with a score of 54.
Even though there appears to be a misalignment between the customer expectations and actual
service quality, its high price-to-earnings ratio of 14.1 and highest share price among the lowcost carriers in August of 2015 represents the disconnect between satisfying the investors and
shareholders of Wall Street versus the employees and customers of Main Street. Therefore, the
business-level strategy is not an effective indicator of long-term and sustainable shareholder
value, but instead involves the participation and satisfaction of employees of the company, who,
through their service to the customers, will move the airline forward in long-term and sustainable
value.
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